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CHARACTERIZATION, RES JUDICATA AND THE
LAWYERS' CLAUSE
C. B. DUTTON JR.*

In December, 1944, Mr. Justice Jackson, in his Cardozo
Lecture to the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York,' observed that Article IV, Section I of the United
States Constitution, the so-called "Full Faith and Credit
Clause," was peculiarly a lawyers' clause. He found the clause
to be more concerned with techniques of the law than with
social and political considerations, but noted that the clause
is relatively a neglected one, as to which history is obscure,
precedents scarce, and. penetrating analysis and criticism
lacking2
The pertinency of these remarks had been pointed up principally by a few rather dramatic cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1935 and the time at which Mr. Justice
Jackson spoke.3 Opinions handed down since that time, and
most of the subsidiary literature provoked by these decisions,
have emphasized the need for thoughtful analysis and judicial clarification of the full faith and credit problem, but
have done little in response to Mr. Justice Jackson's conclud* Assistant Professor, Indiana University School of Law.
1. The full text appears under the title "Full Faith and CreditThe Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution" in (1945) 45 Col. L.
Rev. 1.
2. Jackson, supra note 1, at 2,3.
3. Particularly, Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933); Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935); Davis v. Davis,
305 U.S. 32 (1938); Pink v. AAA Highway Express, Inc., 314
U.S.201 (1941); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942);
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943); Barber
v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944).
(201)
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ing plea that we "not suffer this lawyers' clause to become
the orphan clause."
It is apparent that there are wide areas of disagreement
between the justices of the Supreme Court as to the meaning
and application of the clause. 4 In addition there is some
evidence of vacillation in opinion by individual justices.5
The opinions contain vague references to principles of conflict of laws, res judicata and merger, which are so phrased
as to make exact examination of the bases of decision almost
impossible. Contrary to Mr. Jutice Jackson's definition, the
recent cases seem to show the court more concerned with the
social and political implications of the clause than with legal
techniques. The clause is not discussed in some cases where
it might be applicable, and no explanation of its omission or
inapplicability is given. 6 The result is an impression of confusion and unpredictability that is, if nothing else, discouraging to those working in the field.
Here as for any series of court opinions, explanations
4.

5.
-

6.

In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943), the
justices divided 5 to 4, Jackson, J., concurring specially and
Douglas and Black, J.J., writing separate dissenting opinions.
In Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), the division
was 6-3, Murphy, J., joined by Stone, C.J., and Jackson, J., concurring specially, and Rutledge and Black, J.J., writing dissenting opinions. In Griffin v. Griffin, 66 S.Ct. 556 (1946), the
justices split 6-2-1, Black and Douglas, J.J., dissenting in part,
and Frankfurter, J., dissenting entirely. In Heiser v. Woodruff,
66 S.Ct. 853 (1946), the court stood 6-2, but Rutledge, J., concurred only in the result. In Morris v. Jones, 67 S.Ct. 451 (1947),
the division was 6-3.
Length of opinions and difference in nature of the causes makes
this difficult to establish. However, compare the late Justice Stone's
argument for the superior interests of the second state in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933), and denying effect
to equally significant interests in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943). Also compare Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in Morris v. Jones, 67 S.Ct. 451 (1947), with his concurrence with the majority in Magnolia v. Hunt, supra; Justice
Douglas writing for the court in Morris v. Jones, supra, but
joining Justice Black's dissent in the Magnolia case, supra (Justice Douglas' own dissent in the latter case is not inconsistent
with his opinion in Morris v. Jones, supra); Justice Rutledge
dissenting in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945),
and joining the dissent of Justice Frankfurter in Morris v.
Jones, supra.
This is most apt to happen, of course, in cases not carried to
the U.S. Supreme Court. Cf. Jackson, supra note 1, at 3, and
cases cited. See Bretsky v. Lehigh Valley R,R., 156 F.(2d) 594
(C.C.A. 2d, 1946).
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can be manufactured wholesale. 7 It is not the purpose of
this paper to add one more set of rationalizations for some
or all of the recent full faith and credit decisions. Its object,
rather, is to inquire into the nature of the legal problems
which exist in any case involving Article IV, Section 1, and
to mark out such threads of consistency as may be present.
Constitution and statute being so unspecific, and constitutional and legislative history having proved so unproductive
of meaning, 8 it is believed it may be helpful, in a case actually
or potentially affected by the clause, to direct attention first
to the nature of the entire case in terms of conflict of laws.
The Constitution and statute then may be examined to determine what changes in conflict of laws have been regarded
as necessary or desirable.9
Patently, the draftsmen of the Constitution meant something when they incorporated Article IV, Section 1 into their
document, and the first Congress also meant something when
it adopted the full faith and credit statute.1 o The drafts7.

8.

9.

10.

Most of the cases referred to in the notes immediately preceding
have been widely reviewed and commented upon. The divorce
cases, as might be expected, have fomented the largest amount
of comment. See Lorenzen, "Haddock v. Haddock Overruled"
(1943) 52 Yale L.J. 341; Cook, "Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled?" (1943) 18 Ind. L.J. 165; Powell, "And -Repent at Leisure" (1945) 58 Harv. L. Rev. 930; Corwin, "Out-Haddocking
Haddock" (1945) 93 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 341. See also Wolkin,
"Workmen's Compensation Award" (1944) 92 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
401; Cheatham, "Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit
Claause" (1944) 44 Col. L. Rev. 330.
Cf. Justice Jackson's comments on the history of the clause and
the full faith and credit statutes in his speech cited supra note
1, at 3 ff. See Justice Frankfurter's summary of history in
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); and the remarks of Corwin, supra note 7, at 346. In general see Costigan,
"The History of the Adoption of §1 of Art. IV, of the U.S. Constitution" (1904) 4 Col. L. Rev. 470; Radin, "The Authenticated
L. Rev. 1.
Full Faith and Credit Clause, Its History" (1944) 39 Ill.
It may well be asked what difference such an approach will
make. Are not the results reached likely to be very much the
same? The answer is that the search for precedent is made
more meaningful and it becomes less necessary to become involved in predicting personal preferences and beliefs of judges.
Cf. Jackson, supra note 1, at 16: "I think it difficult to point
to any field in which the Court has more completely demonstrated
or more candidly confessed the lack of guiding standards of a
legal character . . . ."; and at 28: "Certainly the personal
preferences of the Justices among the conflicting state policies
is not a permissible basis of determining which shall prevail in
a case."
Cf. Moore &
Rev. Stat. §905 (1875), 28 U.S.C. §687 (1940).
Oglebay, "The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit" (1943)
29 Va. L. Rev. 557 at 558 ff.
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men knew there were common law rules for dealing with
"foreign" law or that such rules would be developed as the
necessity arose. Since the Constitution preserved the separate
legal systems of the several states, it also was known that
these rules would operate. In view of the general desire to
prevent such state "nationalism" as would be inimical to
the success of the new Federation, it is only reasonable to
assume that what was sought was to assure adoption of
generous rules for dealing with the law of "sister states".
However, because of early confusion in the common law
applicable to this general problem,11 decisions involving the
full faith and credit clause developed largely from unsupported intuitions of'Supreme Court judges, little or no effort
being made to correlate results with, or to distinguish them
from, those which would have been reached without the
direction of the Constitution. In view of the infrequency
of reference to the clause until modern times, and the relatively unstabilized condition of the "law" of the clause, it
is not inappropriate to reconsider the question of the credit
to be accorded to judgmentslla in this manner. The result
may be to discover that many controversial cases can be
disposed of on principles of general acceptance without injecting issues of "policy" or a judge's philosophy of government.
I
Congress has only twice elected to act under its authority to implement the Constitutional mandate' 2 that full
faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.
The first statute, enacted in 179013 provides a method of
authenticating records and judicial proceedings and then
11.

Ila.

12.

13.

Cf. Jackson, supra note 1, at 6.

See also, arguments of counsel,

particularly for Plaintiffs in Error, in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113,123 (1895).
The full faith and credit law of judgments is singled out for

separate analysis because Congress has marked it for special
attention and because most of the controversy reflected in recent
decisions has fallen in this area.
U.S. Const. Art. IV, §1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given
in each state to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
Rev. Stat. §905 (1875), 28 U.S.C. §687 (1940).
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provides that records and judicial proceedings so authenticated "shall have such faith and credit given to them in every
court within the United States, as they have by law or usage
in the courts of the state from whence the said records are
or shall be taken." The second statute, enacted in 180414 is
not relevant to this discussion.
What is the effect of this statute? Mr. Justice Jackson
and others have suggested that it involves questions of conflict of laws. 15 This would seem to be indisputable. The
real problem is in what way does it involve the conflict of
laws, or perhaps better, what effect does it have on a state's
conflict of laws rules? It is suggested that the statute concerns itself not with the traditional problems of conflict of
laws in the sense of selecting a rule from that body of precedent (such as "the law of the place of making of a contract governs the validity of the contract"), but rather
that it relates solely to questions which are preliminary to
and implicit in the applications of more familiar rules of
conflict of laws, the so-called questions of characterization
or qualification.'8 In other words the statute supplies to
the courts of the United States not their rules of conflicL
of laws of connection to the law of a sister state, but instead
answers certain questions as to their conflict of laws rules
of characterization.
14.
15.

16.

Rev. Stat. §906 (1875), 28 U.S.C. §688 (1940). This act has to
do with authentication of non-judicial records.
See Jackson, supra note 1, at 2; Cheatham, supra note 7. Justice Jackson, at page 30 of the same article also observes:
"But while the American law of conflicts is a somewhat parallel
and contemporaneous development with the law of full faith and
credit, they are also quite independent evolutions, are based on
contrary assumptions, and at times support conflicting results."
It can be demonstrated that, in any conflict of laws case problems of characterization or qualification are more significant to
the actual decision than the selection of the conflict of laws
rule, as such. Characterization, broadly speaking, involves decision of the questions, usually overlooked, of what law shall be
referred to by the forum for assistance in evaluating the legal
relations at issue in a given case, and in light of those decisions,
definition of terms and qualitative appraisal of the rules of connection and of the law to which reference is made. In other
words the meaning of a rule of law, and the way in which and
the purpose for which it is applied is much more significant
than the rule itself. See Cook, "Logical & Legal Bases of Confict of Laws" (1942) c. VIII; Lorenzen, "The Qualification,
Classification, or Characterization Problem in the Conflict of
Laws" (1941) 50 Yale L.J. 743.
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II
At the outset it is necessary to keep in mind that the
"case" itself is separate from the judgment that figures as
part of the case. This is clear where, an action having been
filed, the defendant pleads previous adjudication and introduces a properly authenticated judgment of another state
in evidence. The "case" then is that set out in the plaintiff's brief and consists of "foreign" or out-of-state elements
as well as local elements. The judgment is another "foreign"
element injected into the case by the defendant.
That the case is distinct from the judgment is equally
true where the suit is "on the judgment" of a sister state
notwithstanding the tendency to say that the original claim
has been merged and thus destroyed by the judgment. The
claim underlies the judgment and is in fact what plaintiff
sues upon.1 7 For pleading purposes he presents the judgment as a shorthand statement of the claim and, if accepted,
it operates as proof of the claim. But when the conclusiveness of the judgment is put at issue the very purpose of
the suit is to determine whether the judgment does "prove"
the claim.
The "case" having been filed and the judgment having
been introduced either by plaintiff or defendant, under now
traditional conflict of laws principles the first question for
a court is "Is there a significant sister state (foreign) element in this case"?18 This question is one of characterization and is assumed to be anwered by the forum's own law. 1-,
In the usual conflict of laws case, the law of the forum may
permit a court to answer this question in the negative, and
17.

18.

Boynton v. Ball, 121 U.S. 457, 466 (1887); 2 Freeman, "Judgments"
(5th ed. 1925) §550; Pirsig, "Merger by Judgment" (1944) 28
Minn. L. Rev. 420. Chief Justice Stone in Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,439 (1943) writes ". . . a cause of

action merged in a judgment in one state is likewise merged in
every other." This is an unfortunate use of language but is
not contrary to the concept expressed here. Mr. Chief Justice
Stone was discussing the "conclusiveness" of judgments and not
the question of destruction of the original cause.
Actually, the first question is "By reference to what law shall
it be determined whether there is a significant foreign element
present?"

19.

This question is of necessity answered, "By the law

of the forum."
Restatement, "Conflict of Laws" (1934) § 7(a), comment b;
Lorenzen, supra note 16. See Cook, op. cit. supra note 16, c.
VIII.
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thereafter proceed to handle the case as one not involving
conflict of laws.2 0 If the case involves a sister state's judgment, however, the Constitution and statute supply the law
(answer) of the forum which is "yes"-a sister state judgment is always to be considered if introduced. It is only
"conditionally" significant, however, because as has been
stated, 1whether it controls the case is the issue to be deter2

mined.

The second problem of characterization becomes, "By
reference to what law shall the precise significance of this
'conditionally significant' sister state element be determined ? ' 22 Obviously it may make considerable difference as
to the outcome of the case whether the law of the rendering
state determines this question or whether the law of the
forum decides it. Since this also is a preliminary question,
the answer given, at least by implication, in an ordinary
conflict of laws case is again, "By the law of the forum".23
In the case with the judgment element in it, however, the
forum cannot apply this usual rule, for the Constitution and
statute step in to eliminate any discretion the law of the
forum normally allows its courts, and the usual rule itself.
Under Constitution and statute, the forum must determine
the possible significance of the judgment4 not by its own law
2
but by the law of the rendering state.

This is not the end of the characterization problem in
20.

Neither the full faith and credit clause, nor any other provision

of the U.S. Const. has yet been interpreted as rigidly requiring

recognition of sister state common or statute law. The recognition given such "foreign" law therefore still rests with con21.

flict of laws principles of the forum.
In the non-judgment type of conflict of laws case, a court would

not examine "conditionally" significant elements, but would decide outright what elements are significant.

22.

The wording "by reference to" foreign law is employed by the
writer as one way to avoid the difficulties inherent in the tra-

ditional conflict of laws concept that a court 'applies' foreign
law on principles of comity. Whatever law is applied is the law

of the forum, the real question being "to what law shall the

forum make its rule for this case as nearly as possible homologous." Cf. Cook, op cit. supra note 16, cc. II; Restatement,

23.
24.

"Conflict of Laws" (1934) §§6,7.
Cf. authorities cited supra note 19.

The question of whether there are exceptions to the mandate of
the statute, discussed subsequently in connection with the effect

of sister-state judgments as res judicata, could, of course, be
introduced here. This has not been the level at which the courts
have raised the question however.
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a conflict of laws case involving a sister state judgment,
but it is its core. For if the sister state "law" to which
reference is made is that the claim now before the forum is
conclusively established, or precluded, by the judgment, the
case is, or at least would seem to be, settled. Nothing remains for the forum to do but enter its judgment accordingly. If, on the other hand, by the "law" of the sister state
to which reference is made, the judgment would neither establish nor preclude an identical action brought before one
of the rendering state's courts, 2 5 then the case reverts, as
to the forum, to the condition of a case not involving a
judgment. The forum is then free to apply its usual rules
of conflict of laws, both of characterization and of connection.
Two more questions of characterization remain: "What
is meant by the term 'law' of the rendering state," and
"What is the law, as so defined?" The latter is a specific
problem for a specific case, but the former, the meaning
of "law" of the rendering state, is perhaps the most interesting problem of those here discussed, and its importance
cannot be overlooked.
Professor Cheatham has suggested that recent decisions
on the effect of Article IV, Section 1, and the statute on
judgments give some evidence that the Supreme Court has
fallen, or may fall, into difficulty over improper understanding (characterization) of the concept of "law" of the rendering state when it makes its search for the effect that must
be given in one state to a judgment of another.2 6 His suggestion is that the "law" of the rendering state as to its
judgment may be (1) the domestic or non-conflict law of
the rendering state; (2) the conflict of laws law of the rendering state applicable to the same case, thus introducing the
problem of the renvoi; (3) the rendering state's conflict of
laws rules for a similar but converse case involving a sister
state's judgment thus raising a problem in reciprocity; or
(4) a pronouncement by the rendering state made at the
time the judgment was entered, as to what effect the judgment shall have in other states.
25.

This assumes, for the moment, that the rendering state would
not find its first judgment res judicata even if attacked for lack
of jurisdiction. As to this see note 53, infra.

26.

Cheatham, "Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause"
(1944)

44 Col. L. Rev. 330,337.

19471

CHARACTERIZATION

Since these possibilities seem to be statistically exhaustive, they merit examination both in light of the thesis of
this paper and of decisions of the Supreme Court subsequent
to the casd on which Professor Cheatham founded his
remarks.
The first possibility, that the "law" to which required
reference must be made is the domestic or non-conflict law
of the rendering state, is not only the likeliest possibility, but
in fact is the only acceptable one.2 7 The Supreme Court has
now stated this rather emphatically.28 As to the rendering
state, the judgment is a domestic element, if for no other
reason, because a court is incapable of rendering any other
sort of judgment. 29 In the first instance the reference to the
sister-state judgment is made to determine whether the foreign court has already decided this very case. Only non-conflict law can be of assistance here.
As to the second possibility, it may be disposed of summarily. The complexity of the renvoi doctrine is met when
a court (of State A), having before it a conflict of laws
case, selects a rule of conflict of laws of connection which
causes it to "refer" to the law of another state (State B).
Upon making the reference, however, it is found that a court
of State B, if it were hearing an identical case (assuming
it had jurisdiction) would select a different conflict of laws
rule of connection, its rule either occasioning reference to
the law of State A, or to that of a third state.30 State A, if
it also adopts as its own this law of State B might find itself
playing what has been termed inter-national (or inter-state)
lawn tennis.3 1
The renvoi problem cannot arise, however, when the
27. Prof Cheatham also recognized this. See Id. at 339,340.
28. Morris v. Jones, 67 S.Ct. 451,456 (1947). Cf. Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
29. Cf. Cook, op. cit., supra note 16, cc. I,II,III.
30. See Lorenzen, "The Renvoi Theory" (1910) 10 Col. L. Rev. 190,
327, "The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws" (1918) 27
Yale L.J. 509; Schreiber, "The Doctrine of the Renvoi in AngloAmerican Law" (1917) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 523; Note, (1945) 31
Iowa L. Rev 130; Cook, "Logical and Legal Bases of Conflict of
Laws" (1942) c. IX.
31. See In re Tallmadge, 109 Misc. 696, 181 N.Y.S. 336 (1919). It
should be noted that characterization by the law of one state,
followed by re-characterization under the different rule of another state produces a result much like renvoi, but that it is
not the same thing.
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reference is made not to learn how the second state would
decide this very case, but rather if it has decided it. Furthermore if an identical case were presented to the rendering
state, it might not be a conflict of laws case at all. The judgment which is the "foreign" element in a sister state, is a local
element in the rendering state and there might be no other
"foreign" elements. But to the extent that the identical case
when presented to the courts of the rendering state is "like" a
conflict of laws case, the applicable rule is that the effect of
the judgment is to be determined by the law of the rendering
state itself 2 Both states are thus connected to the same
state law, and there is no renvoi.
As to the third "possibility", the doctrine of reciprocity
comes into play only when a state has a conflict of laws rule
that connects it to another body of law, but as a matter of
policy its courts will not recognize or adopt the "foreign"
law thus referred to unless in a similar, but converse case,
the courts of the foreign state would give similar recognition
to the law of the forum.33 As to the recognition here described for sister state judgments, reciprocity is simply not
involved. The law developed in the rendering state for determining how it shall regard its own judgments would not include determination of how it would treat foreign judgments. In any event, the recognition of foreign judgments
which the reciprocity doctrine avoids, is compelled by the
full faith and credit statute which applies with equal force to
the courts of every state.
As to the fourth possibility, that the rendering state may
prescribe in a judgment the effect it shall have in other
states, the problem is more difficult, being in fact, dual in
nature. It is one question whether a court may prescribe
the extent to which its judgment shall conclude or preclude
litigation in a sister state, and a wholly different one whether a court's express or implied limitation of the effect of
its judgment shall be accepted.
That a court should attempt to prescribe its judgment's
32.

This rule is, of course, not supplied by Art. IV, §1, but by the
state's own law of res judicata. It conforms to the relevant conflict of laws rule, however. Cf. Restatement, "Conflict of Laws"
(1934) §450.

33. In other words, recognition is withheld unless the second state,
if it had before it a similar case involving a judgment of the
enquiring state, would give credit to such judgment.
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entire effect in other states seems both unlikely and unwise.
Theories of territorial limitations on the jurisdiction of judicial bodies 34a are too firmly imbedded in our legal system
to be lightly discarded. At best, a statement that a judgment shall have certain positive effect (i.e. shall be res judicata) outside the borders of the rendering state would
amount to an expression of hope that the courts of other
states, and ultimately the United States Supreme Court, will
take the same view of the judgment's effect.
Some evidence that the Supreme Court will take account
of the intent of the rendering court as to the effect of its
judgment in other states does appear in recent decisions,34b
but for the present at least, it is believed that such language
should be confined to the second facet of this problem, that
of whether effect shall be given to a court's limitations of
its judgment. That a court may expressly limit its judgment so that it will not be res judicata as to certain matters
is clear under the recent decision of Wisconsin v. McCartin84c
It can be argued that a judgment also is not res judicata
as to matters which, because of the nature of the action,
were not, or could not be, considered.35 In any event, an
34a. Cf. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943), at
440: "For Texas is without power to give extra territorial effect
to its laws." Also American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 347 (1909); Restatement, "Conflict of Laws" (1934)
§1; Story, "Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws" (1834) §7.
34b. See dissenting opinion of Black, J. in the Magnolia case, supra
note 34a, at 451: "Did Texas intend the award of its Industrial
Accident Board against the insurer to bar the right granted the
employee by the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law to collect from his employer for the same injury the difference between the compensation allowed by Texas and the more generous
compensation allowed by Louisiana?"; and the opinion of the
court in Wisconsin v. McCartin, decided March 31, 1947 67 S.Ct.
886 (1942): "If it were apparent that the Illinois award was intended to be final and conclusive of all the employee's rights against the
employer and the insurer growing out of the injury, the decision in
the Magnolia Petroleum Co. case would be controlling here. ...
But there is nothing in the statute or in the decisions thereunder to indicate that it was designed to preclude any recovery
by proceedings brought in another state for injuries received
there in the course of an Illinois employment."
34c. Decided March 31, 1947. 67 S.Ct. 886 (1947).
35. Cf. note 51 infra. Wisconsin v. McCartin, supra note 34c, may
indicate that the rule of Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, supra
note 34a, is to be sharply limited and perhaps indirectly over-ruled
for it attributes to the Magnolia case a finding that that case
did not necessarily embrace. In referring to the Magnolia decision, Justice Murphy, writing for the court says: "The court
there found that the compensation award under the Texas Work-
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indication by a court that its judgment does not extend to
certain matters does not represent an attempt to give extraterritorial effect to a states' laws or judicial decisions in
the sense that has long been regarded as objectionable and
impracticable,6 for this is only an advance statement of
what the local law of a state is as to the judgment rendered,
made by the court best qualified to define it.
Thus we are left as we began, with a fairly clear indication that Constitution and statute direct that in referring
to sister state law to determine the effect of a judgment of
such sister state, the "law" referred to is the domestic or
non-conflict law of the rendering state. As to this, there
are, of course, two questions to be answered: (1) What
domestic (non-conflict of laws) law declares the effect of
judgments within a state? (2) If the effect of a judgment
under the law of the rendering state is somehow at odds
with conceptions of justice of the inquiring state, can the
command of the Constitution and statute be subverted or
ignored in furtherance of the latter's policy?
The answer to (1) is: The law of res judicata of the
rendering state.3 6a The answer to (2), because of the terms
37
of the statute, would appear to be even more concise: No.
Nonetheless it is on this latter point that the court is most
violently in disagreement.38
men's Compensation Law was made explicitly in lieu of any
other recovery for injury to the employee, precluding even a
recovery under the laws of another state." Compare this with
the statement of Stone, J., writing for the majority in the Mag-

nolia case, 320 U.S. 430 at 440: "But whether the Texas award
purported also to adjudicate the rights and duties of the parties
under the Louisiana law or to control persons and courts in
Louisiana is irrelevant to our present inquiry. For Texas is
without power to give extra-territorial effect to its laws." To be
noted also is that Justice Murphy joined with Justice Douglas in
dissenting in the latter case.
36. See note 34a, supra.
36a. The term "res judicata" is here used in its broadest sense. Cf.
Restatement, "Judgments" (1942) Intro. Com. to §41.
37. "The very purpose of the constitutional provision and the federal statute, however, was to end the old state freedom in conflict of laws, and to deny to the second state, Louisiana, the
privilege to determine for itself whether to give effect to the
judgment of another state, Texas." Cheatham, "Res Judicata
and the Full Faith and Credit Clause" (1944) 44 Col. L. Rev.
330,336. Moore & Oglebay, "The Supreme Court and Full Faith
and Credit" (1943) 29 Va. L.R. 557,615.
38. See cases cited supra note 4; Stone, J., dissenting in Yarborough
v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933).
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A final purpose of this article is to suggest that proper
examination, and decision, of the problem of res judicata
would render much of the controversy over local policy and
interests both out of place and unnecessary.
Another recent case, Morris v. Jones39 furnishes an
illustration of the importance of making a specific finding
of the law of res judicata of the rendering state prior to and
independently of questions of policy. In this case plaintiff sought to introduce a duly authenticated copy of
a Missouri judgment as proof of claim in Illinois proceedings against the Illinois statutory liquidator of Chicago
40
Lloyds, the unincorporated defendant in the Missouri action.
The Missouri action had been begun prior to the appointment of the liquidator, but was carried to judgment notwithstanding an order of the Illinois Court staying all proceedings against Chicago Lloyds and providing for filing
of claims with the liquidator. Plaintiff had notice of this
order and the Missouri Court was advised of it at the time
the Chicago Lloyds attorney, lon direction of the liquidator,
withdrew from the Missouri case. The Supreme Court pf
Illinois denied credit to the Missouri decree on the grounds
that it was Missouri's responsibility to give credit to the
Illinois decree and that, in any event, the judgment could
not be enforced against assets in the hands of the Illinois
liquidator.
The United States Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision reversed the Illinois Court, ruling that cases holding that a
court appointing a receiver or statutory liquidator draws
to itself exclusive control of proof of claims were erroneous,
that the Missouri action was not abated by the Illinois decree, and that there was no lack of privity between Chicago
Lloyds and the liquidator or any difference in the cause of
action because of the technical difference in defendants.
The Missouri judgment therefore was entitled to full faith
and credit. Justice Douglas, who wrote the opinion of the
court stated:
"It is no more important that the suit on this underlying
claim could not have been maintained in Illinois after the
liquidator had been appointed than the fact that a statute
39.

67 S.Ct. 451 (1947).

40.

The Missouri action was for malicious prosecution and false
arrest.
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of limitations of the State of the forum might have barred
it

.

.

.

. And the Missouri judgment may not be de-

feated by virtue of the fact that under other circumstances
petitioner might not have been able to obtain it in Missouri
or to have received any benefit from it there, as, for example,
if a liquidator had been appointed for the debtor in Missouri
prior to judgment. The full faith and credit to which a
judgment is entitled is the credit which it has in the State
from which it is taken, not the credit that under other circumstances and conditions it might have had. Moreover,
the question whether a judgment is entitled to full faith
and credit does not depend on the presence of reciprocal engagements between the States.
Under Missouri law petitioner's judgment was a final
determination of the nature and amount of his claim ....
That determination is final and conclusive in all courts."4 '
Only after making the statements quoted and briefly
reviewing the authorities on which they rest, does Justice
Douglas devote attention to the issue of the asserted conflicting and superior interests of the State of Illinois. As
to such asserted interests, he states: "The command is to
give full faith and credit to every judgment of a sister
state" 42 (italics added) and again "The function of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause is to resolve controveries where state
policies differ.

' 43

In other words if by the law of Missouri the

judgment would be res judicata as to the trial in Missouri of
a case identical to the one in Illinois, that result obtains also
in other states, even though the exact case here presented in
Illinois, could not for technical or jurisdictional reasons be
presented to a Missouri court.
Exceptions under the full faith and credit clause hate
perhaps been more numerous than Justice Douglas inti41.
42.
43.
44.

67 S.Ct. 451,456 (1947).
Id. at 457.
Ibid.
The question of why the Missouri Court wasn't required to give
full faith and credit to the Illinois statute providing the method
of liquidation, and to the stay proceedings order of the Illinois
Court is interesting. Justice Douglas' answer is that "the place
to raise that defense was in the Missouri proceedings." Another
answer is that thus far statute law and non-final judgments
have not been accorded the degree of credit marked out for final
judgments. See Stone, J., in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,

320 U.S. 430,437 (1943).
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mates,4 5 but his viewpoint and willingness to meet issues
46
squarely, if somewhat sketchily, is refreshing.
The dissenting opinion in Morris v. Jones is more in
keeping with traditional full faith and credit cases and serves
to point up the advantage of employing the common law
analysis as much as possible. Justice Frankfurter, with whom
concurred Justices Rutledge and Black, briefly deals with
the question of whether the liquidator is in privity with
Chicago Lloyds, his discussion being in terms of asserted
Illinois law47 instead of the law of Missouri. He then de-

votes the greater part of his opinion to the issue of Illinois'
right to pursue her own policies even when to do so means
denying credit to judgments of a sister state.
If he is right, however, that "the Illinois liquidator was
a stranger to the Missouri judgment and it cannot be invoked against him in Illinois," 48 this lengthy development
of the superiority of Illinois policy is wholly inappropriate,
for a judgment is not res judicata against a stranger nor
45.

46.
47.
48.

The largest class of "exceptions" has devoleped under the heading
of lack of jurisdiction by the rendering court. Cf. Griffin v. Griffin, 66 S.Ct. 556 (1946); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226 (1945); Pink v. AAA Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201 (1941);
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S.
1 (1909); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Bell v. Bell,
181 U.S. 175 (1901); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877);
Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (U.S. 1873). Other exceptions, which may or may not be substantial, are based on (1)
denial of use of courts: Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis
Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903). But cf. Kenny v. Supreme Lodge, 252
U.S. 411 (1907).
(2) Judgments for penalty: Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888). But query in view of Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
(3) Fraud: Levin
v. Gladstein, 142 N.C. 482, 55 S.E. 371 (1906); and compare dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J., in Williams v. North Carolina,
supra at 254; Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218 (1929); Titus
v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282 (1939). But cf. Christmas v. Russell,
5 Wall. 290 (U.S. 1866); Heiser v. Woodruff, 66 S.Ct. 853 (1946);
Goodrich, "Five Years of Conflict of Laws" (1946 Practicing Law
Institute), (1946) 32 Va. L. Rev. 295; 3 Freeman, "Judgments"
(5th ed. 1925) §§1401-4. Other exceptions have been alleged, but
most of these relate to the question of res judicata. See Notes
(1943) 88 L. Ed. 389, (1941) 41 Col. L. Rev. 878; Moore & Oglebay, "The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit" (1943) 29
Va. L. Rev. 557.
As to the res judicata law of Missouri, Justice Douglas cites only
3 cases (67 S.Ct. 451,456); as to privity, one case, and that from
the U.S. Sup. Ct. (Id. at 455).
Actually, Justice Frankfurter discusses only four U.S. Sup. Ct.
decisions, and makes no reference to Illinois precedent. Id. at 461.
67 S.Ct. 451,461 (1947).
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as to a dissimilar subsequent action. 4' Illinois would be free
to decide the case without reference to the judgment. Only
if the dissenting judges were to concede that the majority is
correct as to the effect of the Missouri judgment as res
judicata does the discussion of policy become pertinent.
A very similar problem was presented to the Court in
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt.5 In that case a Texas
workmen's compensation award was introduced in bar of
an action in Louisiana under that state's workmen's compensation law. The Supreme Court ruled that the Texas
award precluded any award under the Louisiana statute.
There are much graver doubts that by Texas law its workmen's compensation decision would be res judicata as to
subsequent action seeking to take account of Louisiana law"'
than that the Missouri court judgment was res judicata as
to the claim presented in Morris v. Jones. Instead of meeting this issue, the dissenting opinions were, and, indeed, a
large part of the majority opinion was, devoted to exchanging viewpoints on the question of subverting one state's
policy to that of the other.
III
That full faith and credit may be denied a judgment
notwithstanding that the judgment is res judicata by the
49.
50.
51.

1 Freeman, "Judgments" (5th ed. 1925) §407; 2 id. §588; 3 id.
§§1392, 1503; Restatement, "Conflict of Laws" (1934) §§70,73,93,94.
320 U.S. 430 (1943).
The reasons for doubt, in the writer's opinion stem from the nature 'of a Workmen's Compensation award. By widely accepted
principles, a Workmen's Compensation case cannot be regarded
as a conflict of laws case (i.e., one in which foreign or sisterstate law can be applied or adopted), even if deemed appropriate.
Because of peculiarities in administration and theory, a Workmen's Compensation case is thought to be always domestic, in the
sense that either local law is applied, or jurisdiction under the
particular statute is declined. In other words, as to the state
with whose court or board a claim is filed, the problem is treated
as one of statutory interpretation (application) exclusively. See
Wisconsin v. McCartin, 67 S.Ct. 886 (1947; Restatement, "Conflict of Laws" (1934) c. 9, topic 3, p. 485, Introductory Note;
Dwan, "Workmen's Compensation and the Conflicts of Laws"
(1927) 11 Minn. L. Rev. 329 (1935), 20 Minn. L. Rev. 19; Angell,
"Recovery under Workmen's Compensation Acts for Injury
Abroad" (1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 619. The familiar principle that
a judgment is res judicata only as to matters actually or possibly
litigated, therefore should operate. Cf. 3 Freeman, "Judgments"
(5th ed. 1925) §1398; Restatement, "Conflict of Laws" (1934)
§403; dissenting opinions of Justices Reed and Rutledge in Angel
v. Bullington, 67 S.Ct. 657 (1947), at 662 and 667 respectively.
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law of the state where it was rendered has been pointed
out.52 One so-called exception justifying this, the one that
has most often found judicial acceptance, relates to questions
of the jurisdiction of the rendering state. It is believed that,
with only slight variation, the analysis outlined above can be
useful in evaluating this exception, and the subtleties now

existing in its name.
In the first place, the question of whether the rendering
state had jurisdiction is really only one facet of the characterization of the significance of a sister-state's judgment
in terms of the law of the state in which the judgment was
rendered. Under some circumstances a judgment may be
res judicata as to the jurisdiction of the court rendering it
as well as to other matters expressly or tactitly litigated.53
But if the parties were justified in not appearing" or if
the issue of jurisdiction of the subject matter actually was
not litigated, 55 and the issue of jurisdiction is raised against
the judgment, it may be found to be of no effect either in
the rendering state or elsewhere.5 6
52. Note 38 supra. Cf. note 45, supra.
53. Jurisdiction of Person: Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S.

25 (1917); Baldwin v. Iowa St. Traveling Men's Ass'n., 283 U.S.
522 (1931); American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932).
Jurisdiction of subject matter: Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938) ;
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938); Chicot Co. Draininge Dist.
v. Baxter St. Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940); Sunshine Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); Gavit, "Jurisdiction of the Subject
Matter and Res Judicata" (1932) 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 386; Bos.
key and Braucher. "Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack" (1940)
40 Col. L. Rev. 1006; Green, "Res Judicata and Its Applicability
to Judgments" (1944) 28 Mimi. L. Rev. 77.
54. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917). Cf. York v. Texas, 137
U.S. 15 (1890); Baldwin v. Iowa St. Traveling Men's Ass'n., 283
U.S. 522 (1931). But see, Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218 (1929).
55. See Vallely v. Northern Fire and M. Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920);
Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940); Restatement, "Judgments" (1942) §10. Considerable doubt as to this is raised by
the authorities cited supra note 53. It has been held that where
a court refuses to pass on the issue of jurisdiction, an award is
subject to attack. Bretsky v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 156 F. (2d) 594
(C.C.A. 2d, 1946), noted disapprovingly in (1946) 60 Harv. L.
Rev. 305. It seems clear that where the issue of jurisdiction is
expressly litigated and could have been made the basis of an
appeal, the judgment is res judicata. Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins,
310 U.S. 381 (1940); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S.
66 (1939).
56. See cases cited under "jurisdiction" in note 45 supra. "Of course, if a
tribunal has not jurisdiction to render a judgment valid by the
tests of due process, it is without validity at home and is entitled
to no credit abroad. To give conclusive effect to such a judgment
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On the other hand, if by the law of the rendering state
a judgment cannot be impeached for lack of jurisdiction, or
for lack of other elements of es j.udicata, one would suppose that all that is left is for the inquiring court to enter
its judgment in accordance with the sister-state's judgment.
At least if it refused to do this, the inquiring court must
find that the case falls in an area in which there is an exception based on a predominant policy or interest of the
inquiring state. This is not all there is, however, to the
problem of jurisdiction. The full faith and credit decisions
involving judgments of divorce have injected a further complication which, under existing decisions, seems firmly established.
It was once the rule of the United States Supreme Court
that courts of the state of so-called "matrimonial domicil"
need not give full faith and credit to a divorce valid in the
state where it was rendered.17 This concept has been overruled ;58 but in its place a new and somewhat similar exception, at least as to its result, has arisen. Notwithstanding that the requirement of jurisdiction is satisfied so that
the parties must be conceded to be validly divorced in the
state rendering the divorce judgment, the inquiring state
need not give credit to the judgment if, by its own evaluation
of the jurisdictional fact of domicil, it finds the rendering
state lacked jurisdiction.' ° In other words, although "domicil"
has the same general meaning and significance under the
law of both states, their courts properly may disagree as to
a finding of the facts on which domicil is based-that is,
as to where a particular person is actually domiciled. In
these cases as in others, Constitution and statute would seem
to direct determination (characterization) of the possible
significance of a judgment by the law of the state in which
the judgment was rendered, but apparently by the device of
making a different finding of jurisdictional facts (where
the circumstances make this reasonably possible) the inquiring court may avoid giving credit to an otherwise valid sisterstate judgment. Supreme Court sanction of this practice

57.
58.
59.

would in itself be a denial of due process." Jackson, "Full Faith
and Credit-The Lawyers' Clause" (1945) 45 Col. L. Rev. 1, 8.
Query in view of note 53 supra.
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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has the same net effect as authorizing a refusal of credit
because of differing policies or interests of the inquiring
state. 0
So far, this subtle exception has been limited to cases
involving divorce judgments. In view of the tendency to
cite the divorce opinions in non-divorce cases,6 ' however, it
is possible that the exception may have a larger area of
operation than generally is assumed. For example, when a
state court is asked to enforce the tax judgment of a sisterstate, the state in which the judgment is introduced might
evade the requirement of credit set out in Milwaukee County
v. White Co. 62 by disagreeing with the rendering state's
finding as to the jurisdictional fact (e.g. domicil) 6 3 on which
liability for the tax was based. Similarly, giving full faith
and credit to a judgment based on substituted service against
an absent domiciliary of the rendering state, as is required
by Milliken v. Meyer,(4 might be avoided by the device of
a finding by the court in the second state, that the defendant had not, by the standards of the latter state, in fact been
domiciled in the rendering state at the time process was
issued.65
Although it is unlikely in view of the latest decisions
on the subject,"" it is also possible that a valid judgment
against a foreign corporation might be denied credit if
the state in which the judgment is sued upon finds that the
corporation was not in fact "doing business" in the rendering state. And although even more unlikely, it is possible
that giving the credit required by Magnolia Petroleum Co.
7 for the workmen's compensation award of a sister
v. HuntG
state, might be circumvented by a different finding as to
60.

Cf. Rutledge, J.,

dissenting in Williams v. North Carolina, id at

244. See Cohen v. Cohen, 64 N.E.(2d) 689 (Mass. 1946). But
ef. Shea v. Shea, 60 N.Y.S. (2d) 823 (App. Div., 2d Dept. 1946).
61. See, e.g., use of Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942)
in opinions in Magnolia Petroleum v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
62. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
63. Dramatic illustration of the possibility of such disagreement is afforded by the well known Dorrance litigation. In re Dorrance's
Estate, 309 P. 151, 163 At. 303 (1932), cert. denied sub. nom.
Dorrance v. Pa., 288 U.S. 617 (1933); In re Dorrance's Estate,

64.
65.

115 N.J Eq. 268, 170 Atl. 601 (1934), cert. denied sub. nom. Dorrance v. Martin, 298 U.S. 678 (1936).
311 U.S. 457 (1940).
Cf. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Cooper v. Newell,

66.

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945).

67.

320 U.S. 430 (1943).

173 U.S. 555 (1899).
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the facts upon which the awarding state found jurisdiction
under its laws.
In view of the number and vigor of the dissenting
opinions to this new jurisdictional doctrine68 no extension
of the sort here suggested should be made without the benefit of full research and argument. It may be that, rather
than enlarged, the jurisdictional concept of the divorce cases
will be narrowed or eliminated.
IV
One more comment is necessary to conclude this discussion of the United States conflict of laws of judgments.
When a judgment is found to be res judicata by the law
of the rendering state, the only way to avoid acceptance of
this finding is to deny that Constitution and statute have
the effect here set out as to characterization, or to dilute
their mandate with exceptions favoring the policy of the
inquiring state. But suppose the law of the rendering state
is that the case is not concluded by the judgment, either because the case has not in fact once been litigated or because
the cause of action or parties are not the same. 9
Presumably, the inquiring court now "starts over" on
the case, treating it just as it would if (as indeed has been
determined) there is no judgment to consider. Although it
is believed that this is what should happen, it is nonetheless possible that the full faith and credit claue may be
held to command not only that the law of res judicata of
the rendering state shall be observed, but also that the
Supreme Court may "discover" or create some new and more
comprehensive res judicata law. It may be that this has in
fact subtly taken place.70 If so, this also should be frankly
recognized so that lawyers handling full faith and credit
cases can brief and argue the point, and other judges can
consider it. The Supreme Court will thereby obtain the
benefits of the kind of research and comment in marking
out the effect and implications of Article IV, Section 1, which
Justice Jackson found so unfortunately lacking.
68.
69.
70.

See, e.g. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Griffin
v. Griffin, 66 S.Ct. 556 (1946).
Note 49 supra.
Cf. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943); Angel
v. Bullingten, 67 S.Ct. 657 (1947). Wisconsin v. MeCartin, S.Ct. - (1947) may indicate a reversal of this tendency, however.
See supra note 34d.

